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cross the nation, government agencies,
industries, and academic institutions are
building high-containment biological labo-
ratories to research hazardous pathogens that might
accidentally or intentionally be introduced to the
United States. Experts agree that the knowledge
gained from such labs is a boon to public health—
these are the places where the diagnostic test for
Ebola virus, antitoxins for botulism, and therapies
for multidrug-resistant tuberculosis were developed.
But many of these same experts also point to the need
for strict oversight of high-containment labs, and
some worry that unchecked proliferation of such facil-
ities increases the odds that study pathogens will make
their way into the environment. The challenge for
governing agencies is to provide researchers the flexi-
bility to do their work while ensuring public safety. 
In 2003, the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs convened a hearing on the potential vulnera-
bilities of the U.S. food supply and agricultural sector
to deliberate contamination. Two years earlier, the
United Kingdom had experienced an epidemic of
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) that devastated the
British livestock industry. The disease was not intro-
duced intentionally, but many found the timing dis-
quieting, given the subsequent events of 9/11 and
deaths later that fall from anthrax sent through the
mail. The U.S. agricultural sector accounts for 13%
of the gross domestic product and is vulnerable to
both intentional and accidental introduction of infec-
tious disease, according to Lawrence Dyckman,
director of natural resources and environment for the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). In
testimony at the 2003 hearing, Dyckman identified
more than 40 contagious foreign animal diseases as
threats to the U.S. agricultural economy.
This vulnerability prompted President George W.
Bush to issue Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 9 in 2004. Among other provisions, the
directive called for the secretaries of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to develop secure, state-
of-the-art biocontainment laboratories to research and
develop diagnostic capabilities for exotic animal dis-
eases, including “zoonotic” diseases that can be
transmitted to humans. 
Three years later, the House Energy and Com-
merce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
held a hearing on the proliferation and oversight of
high-containment labs. In testimony before the sub-
committee, Gigi Kwik Gronvall, a senior associate
with the Center for Biosecurity of the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center, said, “Protecting the
nation against destabilizing large-scale epidemics,
whether natural or man-made, is an urgent priority. . . .
[N]ew high-containment laboratories are necessary if
we are to produce the scientific advances needed to
develop medical countermeasures against bioweapons
and emerging diseases.” At the same time, said
Gronvall and other witnesses, the need for rigorous
oversight and training of personnel is paramount. 
NBAF in the News
In response to Directive 9, DHS has announced plans
to build a National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility
(NBAF), a secure facility being planned by DHS that
will support collaborative efforts among researchers
from government agencies and academia. NBAF will
assume the research responsibilities of the current
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located
off the tip of Long Island, New York, where most
U.S. research on exotic livestock disease has been car-
ried out for the last several decades. The PIADC, con-
structed in the 1950s, is nearing the end of its life
cycle and is not easily accessible to visiting researchers. 
DHS is considering six possible sites for the
520,000-square-foot NBAF. These include Plum
Island; Athens, Georgia; Manhattan, Kansas; Flora,
Mississippi; Butner, North Carolina; and San
Antonio, Texas. If built on Plum Island, the NBAF
would replace the current PIADC. The Athens site
would be located on land owned by the University of
Georgia. The Manhattan site would be on the cam-
pus of Kansas State University immediately adjacent
to the Biosecurity Research Institute. In Mississippi,
NBAF would be located at the Flora IndustrialPark owned by the Madison County
Economic Development Authority. In
Butner, NBAF would be located on the
Umstead Research Farm owned by the
USDA. In San Antonio, NBAF would be
located in Texas Research Park, which is
owned and developed by the Texas Research
& Technology Foundation. 
As described by DHS in its draft envi-
ronmental impact statement released in June
2008, NBAF would cost approximately
$45 million to build and employ between
250 and 350 people. Construction would
begin in early 2010 and take approximately
four years to complete. NBAF would be
jointly owned by DHS and the USDA and
would be operated by them or by an outside
contractor.
NBAF would contain BSL-2, -3, -3Ag,
and -4 labs. BSL, short for “biosafety level,”
refers to the potential threat posed by the
agents studied (see table below). BSL-3 and
-4 labs operate under negative air pressure: if
the barrier is breached, air flows into rather
than out of the room. All exhaust air runs
through high-efficiency particulate air filters,
with the actual handling of viruses carried
out in a 3- by 8-foot biosafety cabinet. At a
BSL-3Ag facility, where large animals are
being researched, the room itself functions as
the primary containment area. Workers han-
dling agents in BSL-3, -3Ag, and -4 labs are
required to wear full-body, air-supplied,
positive-pressure personnel suits. All critical
functions are designed with redundant sys-
tems, so for example if the main power is
knocked out, back-up generators kick in.   
DHS and the USDA have identified six
BSL-3 agents for possible study at NBAF
(FMD virus, classical swine fever virus,
African swine fever virus, Rift Valley fever
virus, the Mycoplasma mycoides ssp.mycoides
bacterium that causes contagious bovine
pleuropneumonia, and Japanese encephalitis
virus) and two BSL-4 pathogens (Nipah
virus and Hendra virus). Of these, only Rift
Valley fever virus and Nipah virus are
zoonotic. Researchers will focus on develop-
ing tests to detect the diseases and counter-
measures to prevent them. Other pathogens
could be studied as need dictates. Scientists
will study live and dead animals as well as
tick and mosquito vectors.
Although few scientists have questioned
the need for NBAF, some question the wis-
dom of bringing the facility onto the main-
land, as would be the case if the laboratory
were built anywhere other than Plum
Island. The PIADC, by virtue of being situ-
ated on an island, is protected by a natural
buffer of water that disease vectors and
pathogens are unlikely to cross in the event
of an accidental release. 
In its 1,000-page draft environmental
impact statement, DHS categorized poten-
tial benefits of the NBAF—which include
new biologic knowledge, added jobs, and
enhanced health and safety of the popula-
tion—as “significant.” Under normal operat-
ing conditions, the potential impacts at each
of the proposed locations—such as noise,
traffic, and waste management—were judged
to be “negligible,” “minor,” or “moderate.” 
The impacts of an accidental pathogen
release from NBAF, outlined in Appendix
D of the report, could be far more serious,
potentially resulting in “significant eco-
nomic impacts” if commercial livestock
were exposed, if the pathogen were to
infect wild game, or if wildlife were to
become endemic reservoirs of disease. The
report cites the 2001 outbreak of FMD in
the United Kingdom as resulting in the
slaughter of more than 6 million animals
with US$5 billion lost in tourism, food,
and agriculture. The draft environmental
impact statement estimates that costs for a
similar U.S. outbreak of FMD could reach
$30 billion. According to the document,
“any country experiencing an outbreak [of
FMD] would be subject to a total ban on
its exports, suggesting eradication by
slaughter may be necessary to regain a trad-
ing status.” 
DHS estimates, however, that the prob-
ability of such an accidental release occur-
ring within the lifetime of the facility is
“unlikely but possible” or altogether
“unlikely.” This estimate was based on a
hazard evaluation/accident analysis model
that considered all possible accident initia-
tors and failure modes. Daniel Mead, an
assistant research scientist with the
Southeast Cooperative Wildlife Disease
Study at the University of Georgia College
of Veterinary Medicine, says, “I have worked
in the lab at Plum Island, and the likelihood
of an [infected] insect escaping is next to
none. There are so many checks and bal-
ances, it’s amazing we get any work done.”
He adds, “Destruction of [infected] ani-
mals is pretty common at BSL-3Ag labs.
Incineration and chemical destruction are
tried-and-true methods. There’s no way in
the world a pathogen is going to survive
those processes.”
But even the remote prospect of such an
accident has led to strong public opposition
to NBAF at some of the proposed sites. At a
29 July 2008 public hearing in Butner,
speakers were uniformly opposed to NBAF.
They also expressed concerns about the pro-
jected 25–30 million gallons of wastewater
that would be pretreated and sent through
the municipal sewer system each year; the
increased air emissions from power genera-
tors, traffic, and incineration of animal
carcasses; and the possible accidental release
of infected mosquitos, which would have to
be treated by aerial spraying of insecticides
over a wide area for a protracted period of
time. And they raised questions about the
long-term day-to-day management of the
facility by an as yet unnamed entity.
Bill Felber, executive editor for the daily
Manhattan (Kansas) Mercury, has covered
the public hearings at all six potential NBAF
sites. Felber says the Butner speakers were by
far the most negative toward NBAF. “The
Plum Island crowd was also negative, but
more subdued, largely because they don’t
think they are being seriously considered [as
a site],” he adds. “Georgia had the most
debate back and forth, both positive and
negative. Manhattan was about three to one
in favor of the facility. The Mississippi and
Texas speakers were uniformly positive.”
DHS officials have not said which site
A 488 VOLUME 116 | NUMBER 11 | November 2008 • Environmental Health Perspectives
Spheres of Influence | Oversight Without Obstruction
BSL-1 facilities are suitable for studying well-characterized agents, such as Bacillus
subtilis, that are not known to consistently cause disease in healthy adults.
BSL-2 labs are designed for handling indigenous agents of moderate risk to
humans and the environment. Examples include the hepatitis B virus and
Salmonella bacteria.
BSL-3 facilities are appropriate for handling pathogens of exotic or indigenous
origin with a known potential for serious disease or death resulting from aerosol
transmission. Mycobacterium tuberculosis, which causes tuberculosis, is a BSL-3
pathogen.
BSL-3Ag refers to research with BSL-3 pathogens that primarily affect livestock,
although with some diseases, such as Rift Valley fever (RVF), human transmission
also is possible.
BSL-4 facilities are designed to handle exotic pathogens that pose a high risk of
life-threatening disease in humans and animals through airborne transmission and
for which there is no known vaccine or therapy. Marburg virus is one such
pathogen.
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2007. Biosafety in biomedical and microbiological laboratories.
5th edition. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Available: http://bmbl.od.nih.gov/.
Biosafety Levels Explainedthey prefer. A final environmental impact
statement is due by December 2008, to
be followed by a decision on the site.
Laboratory Expansion
The debate over NBAF mirrors a larger
debate that is arising over the necessity and
wisdom of constructing multiple high-
containment labs across the United States.
In 2007 the House Subcommittee on Over-
sight and Investigations asked the GAO to
investigate the proliferation of BSL-3 and -4
labs, identify the federal agencies respon-
sible for monitoring these labs, and analyze
recent incidents at three high-containment
labs. In the 2007 report High-Containment
Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observa-
tions on the Oversight of the Proliferation of
BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United
States, the GAO reported there were only
two BSL-4 labs operating in the United
States prior to 1990—the U.S. Army
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in
Fort Detrick, Maryland, and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lab
in Atlanta, Georgia. Between 1990 and
2000, three new BSL-4 labs were built—one
at the Viral Immunology Center at Georgia
State University, one at the National
Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland,
and one at the private Southwest Foundation
for Biomedical Research in San Antonio.
Since 9/11, 10 additional BSL-4 labs have
been built, are under construction, or are in
the planning stages.
The proliferation of BSL-3 labs has been
even greater. The GAO reported that the
expansion of BSL-3 labs is widespread across
the country. Most state governments now
have some BSL-3 capacity, at least for diag-
nostic and analytical services, because of the
need for individual state response to bio-
terrorist threats.
Expansion is also taking place within the
academic community. As part of its Strategic
Plan for Biodefense Research, the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID) has funded 13 Regional Biocon-
tainment Laboratories to provide regional
BSL-3 capacity for academic research. In
H.R. 7041, legislation introduced to
Congress on 24 September 2008, Represen-
tative Christopher Carney (D–PA) requested
an additional $71 million over the next three
years to fund “surge capacity” at selected
Regional Biocontainment Laboratories in the
event of a large-scale terror event. 
“Recent natural and bioterrorist events
involving infectious agents have made it very
clear that from a strategic national perspec-
tive, a serious shortage of BSL-3 and BSL-4
laboratory space exists,” the NIAID stated in
“The Need for Biosafety Laboratory Facil-
ities,” a fact sheet posted on the institute’s
website. “Many U.S. institutions and
companies with infectious disease programs
have BSL-3 laboratories required to perform
their research. Most such laboratories, how-
ever, are small, dedicated to particular uses,
or in need of modernization.”
The GAO report counted 1,356 BSL-3
labs registered with the CDC and USDA
Select Agent Programs. These programs reg-
ulate the possession, use, and transfer of
certain biological agents that could pose
“a severe threat to public health and safety.”
The CDC program governs agents that pose
a threat to human health, whereas the
USDA program governs agents that pose a
threat to plant or animal health; some
agents, such as anthrax, affect both humans
and animals and are thus regulated by both
agencies. Any BSL-3 or -4 facility that han-
dles select agents must register with the
appropriate Select Agent Program and
demonstrate that it meets federal safety
requirements for working with those agents.
However, not all BSL-3 and -4 pathogens
are designated as select agents. And the
number of high-containment labs not regis-
tered with the CDC or USDA is unknown. 
The GAO’s concern, as expressed in the
2007 report, is that no single federal agency
is responsible for tracking the number of all
BSL-3 and -4 labs in the United States or
the attendant risks associated with the prolif-
eration of such labs. Yet, federal agencies
charged with protecting the public health
need to know where these facilities are
located and what agents are handled there if
they are to fulfill their missions. “According
to [academic experts in microbiological
research], there is a baseline risk associated
with any high-containment lab, attributable
to human errors,” the report stated. “With
expansion, the aggregate risks will increase.”
GAO cites three recent incidents as evi-
dence of the need for better reporting,
design, and maintenance of biocontainment
labs. In 2006, a lab worker at Texas A&M
University was exposed to Brucella, a BSL-3
pathogen, and later contracted brucellosis.
The worker was not authorized or trained to
work with that bacterium. Confirmation of
the disease was not made until 62 days after
exposure, and Texas A&M officials did not
report the incident to the CDC as required
by law.
In June 2007, the CDC campus in
Atlanta was struck by lightning, knocking
out both primary and back-up power to its
BSL-4 facility. Although no live agents were
in the facility at the time, the outage shut
down the negative air pressure system that is
key to keeping dangerous agents from escap-
ing the containment area.
A third incident, also in 2007, involved
the spread of FMD virus to several farms
near Pirbright, United Kingdom, the site of
several high-containment labs that work
with that pathogen. Though the definitive
cause of the release has not been determined,
officials suspect that contaminated waste-
water from the Pirbright labs leaked into the
surrounding soil, and the live virus was car-
ried offsite by vehicles splashed with
contaminated mud.
Given the real need for high-containment
facilities, what measures can be instituted
to ensure safety? “We are confident that
the procedures we have in place have
improved safety and security for [select
agent] labs,” says Richard Besser, director
of the Coordinating Office for Terrorism
Preparedness and Emergency Response at
the CDC. At the same time, Besser
acknowledges some are concerned about
safety and security in labs that handle dan-
gerous pathogens not covered by the select
agent rules.
Richard Ebright, lab director at the
Waksman Institute of Microbiology at
Rutgers University, believes policies at high-
containment labs should include full video
surveillance at the entrance and in the labs,
having two persons present when handling a
virus, psychological testing for employees,
and unannounced inspections in work areas
and after leaving the lab. 
In her 2007 testimony, Gronvall
pointed to the need for expanded training
in biosafety for researchers working in high-
containment labs, as well as a greater
number of biosafety officers who can help
researchers determine the safest procedures
and practices on an experiment-by-
experiment basis. Systematic analysis of
safety and operational issues is critical, she
wrote, if labs are to learn from their own
and others’ mistakes. She suggested looking
to the aviation, nuclear, and chemical
industries for possible reporting models that
might allow laboratories to share experi-
ences and avoid future accidents.
Besser agrees, with a caveat. “It’s impor-
tant to continually review our systems, to
ask whether there are things that should be
done in other labs to ensure safety and
security,” he says. “But it’s also important
to ensure that any new regulations will
have a high likelihood of improving safety
and security and not restrict research
unnecessarily.” 
In response to concerns expressed by
government and scientific experts, the
Department of Health and Human Services,
USDA, DHS, and Department of Defense
have formed a task force to look at lab safety
and develop a set of recommendations for
improvement. The report is due this fall. 
John Manuel
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